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AND AUDITOR CHANGES 
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Dr. Jere Francis, Dissertation Supervisor 
Abstract 
 
As part of planning and performing financial statement audits, auditors are 
required to make judgments regarding client risk. These judgments permeate the audit 
process, driving decisions regarding client acceptance, audit pricing, the extent of audit 
testing, and the nature of auditors’ written opinions. Although auditors may aim to assess 
each client’s risk independently, prior research suggests individuals’ draw on their 
idiosyncratic experiences and environments for benchmarks against which to contrast the 
case at hand. These “contrast effects” can result in judgments that deviate from those that 
would be reached using normative principles and may cause bias in auditors’ assessment 
of client risk. Consistent with this theory, the archival evidence presented in this paper 
shows that, after controlling for clients’ actual risk levels, auditors perform more (less) 
conservative audits and charge higher (lower) audit fees when clients appear riskier (less 
risky) in the context of other clients audited by the same practice office. Moreover, 
clients subject to increased (decreased) conservatism and higher (lower) audit fees due to 
auditors’ biases are more (less) likely to switch auditors during the following period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For the past several decades researchers have provided robust evidence that 
individuals’ decisions are influenced by contextual information, even when such 
information is normatively irrelevant. In general, this literature finds that humans abhor 
forming judgments in a vacuum. We prefer instead to use comparative information 
whenever possible and often turn to salient reference points in our environments or 
personal experiences for benchmarks. In other words, “human judgment is context 
dependent” and, because contextual details often differ from one decision to the next, 
these judgments exhibit predictable directional biases (Bless and Schwarz 2010, 320).  
This paper examines whether auditors’ over-rely on contextual information when 
they evaluate client risk. Auditors are required to evaluate client risk at the beginning of 
every engagement and must tailor the nature and timing of their audit procedures to the 
risk level of each client (see the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 12). Although auditors 
may attempt to perform an independent risk assessment for each client, prior work on 
“contrast effects” in the field of psychology suggests that, when forming judgments, 
individuals contrast the case at hand with contextual benchmarks. Building on this theory, 
this paper predicts that an auditor will contrast a target client against other clients in his 
or her environment when assessing the target client’s risk. If the riskiness of these 
environmental benchmark firms is not representative of the population at large, the 
auditor’s perception of risk may be skewed. In short, auditors may perceive a target firm 
as riskier when it is surrounded by very safe peers and as safer when it is surrounded by 
very risky peers.  
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Recent experimental studies have documented contrast effects in various 
accounting and finance settings. These settings include investors’ reactions to earnings 
preannouncements (Maletta and Zhang 2012), auditors’ judgments in the application of 
accounting standards (Asay et al. 2015), and auditors’ evaluation of internal control 
quality (Bhattacharjee et al. 2007). Yet none have examined whether this bias affects 
auditors’ perceptions of client risk. There is also a notable lack of archival work on 
contrast effects which is an important gap in the literature because, despite auditors’ 
proven tendency to succumb to cognitive biases in laboratory experiments, there are 
numerous mechanisms (such as a strong regulatory environment, standardized audit 
procedures, multiple level review processes, and other audit quality controls) designed to 
prevent such bias in practice. Moreover, assuming auditor bias persists despite these 
countervailing mechanisms, its effect on audit outcomes remains an open question. This 
last point is consistent with Hogarth (1991, 285), who notes that although “auditors’ 
judgments – like those of other professionals – have been shown to exhibit systematic 
errors and biases… we don’t know the consequences of particular judgmental errors in 
the auditor’s natural ecology”. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by 
providing robust archival evidence on the existence and consequences of contrasting 
effects in the context of auditors’ client risk assessment.   
Two types of client risk are chosen for use in this study because of their close link 
to audit risk. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) defines audit 
risk as “the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion” (see Auditing 
Standard 8). In practice, there are (at least) two reasons that an auditor might issue an 
inappropriate audit opinion. First, the auditor might issue a standard clean opinion when 
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the client’s financial statements contain a material misstatement. Second, the auditor 
might fail to modify his or her opinion when there is significant doubt about the client’s 
ability to continue as a going concern. These two types of audit risk are driven by two 
corresponding types of client risk – the risk of a material misstatement and bankruptcy 
risk – which auditors must evaluate when planning, performing, and pricing their audits.  
Using established proxies for misstatement risk [FScore from Dechow et al. 
(2011)] and bankruptcy risk [Zmijewski’s (1984) bankruptcy prediction model], this 
study creates a series of empirical measures that capture the difference between a client’s 
actual risk when considered in the context of the full population and its apparent risk 
when considered in the context of a restricted set of peers which are likely to be most 
familiar to its auditor. This difference is referred to as “risk bias.” Consistent with 
auditors contrasting the risk of a target client against that of a restricted set of familiar 
firms, the evidence suggests that, after controlling for actual client risk, auditors adjust 
both their level of conservatism and the pricing of their audits in response to a client’s 
apparent risk. Client firms’ financial statements exhibit lower levels of abnormal accruals 
and auditors charge higher audit fees when clients appear to have higher levels of 
misstatement risk. In addition, client firms have a higher likelihood of receiving a going 
concern opinion and auditors charge higher audit fees when clients appear to have higher 
levels of bankruptcy risk. Further investigation confirms that these effects apply both to 
clients which appear more risky than they actually are (i.e. positive risk bias is associated 
with conservative treatment by auditors) as well as to clients which appear less risky than 
they actually are (i.e. negative risk bias is associated with lax treatment by auditors). 
These results are robust to alternative variable definitions and model specifications, as 
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well as numerous controls and propensity-score matching for client size, office size, 
actual risk levels, and audit firm size. Moreover, there is no evidence that proxies for risk 
bias predict negative outcomes over-and-above actual risk levels. That is, misstatement 
risk bias does not predict actual misstatements and bankruptcy risk bias does not predict 
actual bankruptcies, indicating that auditors’ fixation on apparent risk levels is not 
justified. 
This study also examines the impact of risk bias on client retention. Controlling 
for actual client risk, the evidence suggests that clients which appear riskier in the context 
of other clients at their current auditor are more likely to switch to a new auditor during 
the following period. Krishnan (1994, 200) suggests that auditor switches are triggered by 
“auditors’ use of conservative judgments for some clients.” He finds that the threshold for 
a modified report is lower for some clients than for others, and that clients are more likely 
to switch auditors when subjected to lower thresholds. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) 
examine auditors’ enforcement of conservative accruals and come to a similar 
conclusion. The findings of this paper suggest that risk bias may be one reason for such 
heterogeneity in auditor conservatism and for the related decision by clients to switch 
auditors.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
There is a burgeoning literature in the field of cognitive psychology exploring 
humans’ tendency to rely on comparative values when forming judgments (Bless and 
Schwarz 2010). In general, this literature finds that overreliance on contextual reference 
points frequently causes predictable directional bias in judgments (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974; Epley and Gilovich 2005; Critcher and Gilovich 2008). More 
specifically, the literature on “contrast effects” finds that individuals will contrast a given 
stimuli against other contextual stimuli to which they have been recently exposed 
(Feldman and Lynch 1988). This result is both intuitive and empirically robust. For 
example, consumers perceive products as less expensive when placed in a high-price 
context versus a low-price context (Adaval and Monroe 2002). Similar effects have been 
shown in the context of performance evaluation (Sumer and Knight 1996), product 
quality (Lynch et al. 1991), and in many other settings (e.g. Stapel et al. 1998; Wedell et 
al. 1987; Eden 1990).  
More recently, contrast effects have been demonstrated using experiments in 
accounting and finance. Maletta and Zhang (2012) show that investors contrast the 
earnings preannouncements of peer firms and and Asay et al. (2015) find evidence of a 
contrasting effect in auditors’ selection of accounting standards. Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2007), whose work is most closely related to this paper, examine contrast effects in 
auditors’ assessment of  internal control quality. They note that auditors are often 
required to make similar control evaluations for multiple clients and, although they may 
attempt to consider each client independently, theory predicts that other clients’ control 
quality may act as a benchmark against which the quality of a target client’s controls are 
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contrasted. They demonstrate this effect experimentally using two groups of auditors. 
The first group (Group 1) is given a strong set of controls to evaluate and the second 
group (Group 2) is given a weak set of controls to evaluate. Both groups are then asked to 
evaluate a common set of controls. Bhattacharjee et al. find that, consistent with contrast 
effects, Group 1, which was originally exposed to a set of strong controls, is more likely 
to evaluate the common set of controls as weak and Group 2, which was originally 
exposed to a weak set of controls, is more likely to evaluate the common set of controls 
as strong.  
This paper predicts a contrast effect in auditors’ assessment of client risk. When 
assessing risk, auditors may compare a target client to other clients in their environment. 
If client risk varies across auditors’ environments (because, for instance, some audit 
offices have higher risk client portfolios than others) then contrast theory predicts that 
auditors’ perceptions of client risk will vary predictably as a result. This would cause 
auditors to perceive clients evaluated in the context of relatively safe firms as riskier than 
they actually are and clients evaluated in the context of relatively risky firms as safer than 
they actually are. Moreover, because auditors’ perceptions of client risk are an important 
determinant of how they conduct their audits (Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Mock and 
Wright 1999; Bell et al. 2001; O’Donnell and Schultz 2005), bias in their perceptions of 
risk should be observable in audit outcomes.1 This prediction is stated (in alternative 
form) as Hypothesis 1:  
																																																																		
1 Prior research finds that auditors react to perceived client risk by increasing their levels of conservatism. 
For example, Cahan and Zhang (2006) suggest that, following the demise of Arthur Andersen, the 
remaining Big-5 auditors viewed the financial statements of ex-Andersen clients as less credible and as 
having a higher risk of misstatement. As a result of this heightened perception of misstatement risk, Cahan 
and Zhang hypothesize (and show) that ex-Andersen clients were treated with additional conservatism by 
their successor auditors. Specifically, they show that ex-Andersen clients exhibited significant decreases in 
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Hypothesis 1: Controlling for actual risk, clients that appear more (less) risky in 
the context of other clients in the environment are treated more (less) 
conservatively by their auditor.   
The increase in risk bias predicted by Hypothesis 1 is also likely to affect audit 
pricing. Prior work suggests that, in addition to increasing their levels of conservatism, 
auditors respond to heightened levels of perceived client risk by increasing both audit 
effort and billing rates relative to clients with lower perceived risk (Bedard and Johnstone 
2004). Thus one consequence of contrast effects in auditors’ assessment of client risk 
would be higher (lower) total audit fees for clients that appear more (less) risky than they 
actually are. This leads to Hypothesis 2, stated in alternative form:  
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for actual risk, clients that appear more (less) risky in 
the context of other clients in the environment are charged higher (lower) audit 
fees by their auditor.   
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that bias in auditors’ assessment of risk results in 
some (positive risk bias) clients being treated with high levels of conservatism and being 
charged high audit fees, while other (negative risk bias) clients are treated with low levels 
of conservatism and are charged lower fees. Krishnan (1994) suggests that this is 
precisely the sort of idiosyncratic treatment which triggers some client firms to switch 
auditors. Several studies find that clients are more likely to switch auditors after receiving 
a going concern opinion, which is one manifestation of auditor conservatism (Lennox 
2000; Chan et al. 2006). DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) discover a similar effect in 
the context of auditors that enforce the conservative use of accruals. Thus, clients subject 
to positive risk bias by their current auditor may be more likely to switch auditors in the 
																																																																		
abnormal accruals during their first year with a new auditor, relative to clients who were never audited by 
Andersen. 
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future, while clients subject to negative risk bias may be less likely to switch. This 
prediction is stated (in alternative from) as Hypothesis 3:  
Hypothesis 3: Controlling for actual risk, clients that appear more (less) risky in 
the context of other clients in the environment are more (less) likely to switch 
auditors.  
 
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, there are several reasons why the 
contrast effects documented by previous experimental work may not be observed in an 
archival investigation of auditors’ client risk assessment. First, practicing auditors face a 
unique regulatory environment. Since 2002 the PCAOB has had both inspection and 
disciplinary authority over public company auditors, and has implemented standards 
intended to systematize auditors’ assessment of client risk. Auditing Standard No. 12 
dictates six steps that all public company auditors must take as part of their risk 
assessment procedures.2 In addition, some firms have implemented proprietary tools 
designed to further standardize the assessment of client risk. For instance, following 
Deloitte’s failed audit of Adelphia – a particularly risky client – and the related issuance 
of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2237 by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, “Deloitte now uses a proprietary financial analysis tool (‘Deloitte 
Radar’ or ‘DDAR’) to assist in its assessment of substantially all of its U.S. public 
company clients with publicly traded equity securities as to their potential for financial 
																																																																		
2 The risk assessment procedures listed in Auditing Standard No. 12 include: (1) obtaining an 
understanding of the company and its environment; (2) obtaining an understanding of internal control over 
financial reporting; (3) considering information form the client acceptance and retention evaluation, audit 
planning activities, past audits, and other engagements performed for the company; (4) performing 
analytical procedures; (5) conducting a discussion among engagement team members regarding the risks of 
material misstatement; and (6) inquiring of the audit committee, management, and others within the 
company about the risks of material misstatement.  
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statement fraud or business failure. This information is used by Deloitte in planning its 
risk-based audit procedures” (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005, page 12).3  
In addition to the countervailing effects of a strong regulator and formal risk 
benchmarking procedures, auditor specialization may compensate for a general cognitive 
bias. Auditors often become specialists in specific tasks or for particular types of clients. 
Some research suggests that subject matter expertise may mitigate cognitive biases. The 
impact of expertise on cognitive biases is a matter debated in the literature, but one which 
is particularly important when examining how these biases affect auditors’ assessment of 
client risk. Because auditors often specialize, their judgments in practice – as they pertain 
to their area of specialization – may be less prone to the types of bias that experiments 
reveal in a general laboratory setting. Joyce and Biddle (1981, pg. 122) note that “it is 
conceivable (perhaps likely) that trained professionals would use fundamentally different 
cognitive strategies in working problems related to their expertise – strategies much more 
in tune with normative principles.”  
Given the regulated environment in which auditors operate, the existence of 
proprietary tools specifically designed to reduce the subjectivity involved in client risk 
assessment, and the countervailing effects of expertise, it remains an open question 
whether auditors succumb to risk bias.
																																																																		
3 The author of this paper worked as an auditor with Deloitte for several years and has used “Deloitte 
Radar” in practice. The tool benchmarks a particular client’s financial position and risk levels against a 
group of peer firms and requires that the audit engagement team obtain explanations when the client 
appears to be an outlier for a given metric. The benchmarks used by Deloitte Radar are chosen according to 
objective criteria by individuals that are not part of the audit engagement team and who are not based in the 
practice office responsible for the audit.   
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Audit Outcomes Model  
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that, after controlling for actual risk, clients that appear 
riskier relative to surrounding firms will be treated more conservatively by their auditors 
(and vice-versa). The following model is used to test this hypothesis:  Audit	Outcomeit	=	α	+	β	*	Risk	Biasit	+	γ	*	Actual	Client	Riskit	+	δ’X	+	ε	 (1) 
where the subscripts i and t denote firm and year respectively. Two proxies for Actual 
Client Risk are used. First, the FScore developed by Dechow et al. (2011) is used to 
capture clients’ misstatement risk (Misstatement Risk). Second, Zmijewski’s (1984) 
model is used to measure clients’ bankruptcy risk (Bankruptcy Risk). These risk metrics, 
as well as a set of control variables (contained in the vector X in Equation 1 and 
discussed in more detail below) are used to predict two audit outcomes.4 When 
Misstatement Risk is used as the risk metric, the absolute value of performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals (Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals) is used as the dependent 
variable (Kothari et al. 2005; Jones 1991).5 When Bankruptcy Risk is used as the risk 
metric, an indicator variable set equal to 1 for firm-years that receive a going concern 
opinion and set to 0 otherwise (Going Concern) is used as the dependent variable.  
																																																																		
4 The control variables in vector X include year and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. The majority of 
results are robust to the use of metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects as well. However, because 
the dichotomous dependent variables (such as Going Concern) do not vary within some MSAs, the use of 
MSA fixed effects results in significant sample attrition. 
5 The absolute value of abnormal accruals is used in all of the tabulated analyses. As a robustness test, the 
analyses are also performed using the signed value of abnormal accruals and the absolute value of total 
working capital accruals. As expected, the signs on variables of interest are reversed when negative 
abnormal accruals is used. Otherwise, results are similar to those presented in the tabulated analyses.  
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Ex-ante, the group of peer firms which an auditor is most likely to use as points of 
contrast is unclear. The psychology literature emphasizes that “salient” benchmarks are 
more likely to cause bias (Epley and Gilovich 2005; Bless and Schwarz 2010). This 
suggests that auditors are more likely to contrast the risk of a target client against that of a 
small and local set of peer firms. However, individual auditors work as part of highly 
complex and interconnected firms. Moreover, while decisions regarding client risk 
assessment are ultimately the purview of the audit partner, the entire engagement team 
may contribute to the risk assessment process. This could have the effect of broadening 
the set of peer firms used for contrasting. For this reason, four different peer groups are 
considered when measuring Risk Bias in Equation 1: (1) firms that are both within the 
same industry and audited by the same practice office; (2) firms audited by the same 
practice office regardless of industry; (3) firms that are both within the same industry and 
audited by the same firm; and (4) firms audited by the same firm regardless of industry.6 
Combining these four groups with the two measures of risk discussed above (i.e. 
misstatement risk and bankruptcy risk) results in eight proxies for potential risk bias: 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry), Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office), Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-
Industry), Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm), Bankruptcy Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office-Industry), Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to 
Office), Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry), and Bankruptcy 
Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm). These variables are calculated as follows:  
																																																																		
6 Single-digit SIC codes are used to define industries for purposes of defining peer groups. 
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Misstatement	Risk	Bias	(Measured	Relative	to	Peer	Group	X)	=		
(2) 
FGHI	JK	LMNNOGOPQPHO	FMNI	MH	RPPS	TSJUV	WXUQYPS	JK	Z[MPHON	MH	RPPS	TSJUV	W 	
− 	FGHI	JK	LMNNOGOPQPHO	FMNI	MH	RJVU[GOMJHXUQYPS	JK	Z[MPHON	MH	RJVU[GOMJH  
 Bankruptcy	Risk	Bias	(Measured	Relative	to	Peer	Group	X)	=		
(3) 
FGHI	JK	^GHISUVO_`	FMNI	MH	RPPS	TSJUV	WXUQYPS	JK	Z[MPHON	MH	RPPS	TSJUV	W 	
− 	FGHI	JK	^GHISUVO_`	FMNI	MH	RJVU[GOMJHXUQYPS	JK	Z[MPHON	MH	RJVU[GOMJH  
where “Peer Group X” is one of the four peer groups defined above.  
As an example, consider calculating Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative 
to Office) using using Equation (2). The numerator in the first quotient indicates the rank 
of the variable Misstatement Risk for a given firm-year within the group of all firms 
audited by the same practice office during the same year; the denominator in the first 
quotient indicates the total number of firms audited by the same audit office during the 
year; the numerator in the second quotient indicates the rank of the variable Misstatement 
Risk for the given firm-year within the group of all firms audited by any auditor during 
the same year; and the denominator in the second quotient indicates the total number of 
firms receiving an audit by any auditor during the year. Thus the first quotient in 
Equation (2) is a number between 0 and 1 which captures how risky (in terms of potential 
misstatements) a given firm appears when contrasted against the limited set of other firms 
audited by the same practice office, while the second quotient is a number between 0 and 
1 which captures how risky the same firm appears when evaluated in the full risk 
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spectrum. 7 The difference between these two measures is a number between -1 and 1 
which captures the degree to which the auditor’s confined reference group may impact 
his or her perception of risk for the target client. A value of 0 indicates that the target 
client falls into the same percentile of risk within its reference group as it does in the full 
sample of firms receiving audits during the same period. In this case there is no risk of 
bias because the firm’s risk appears the same regardless of whether it is evaluated in the 
context of the entire sample or just those clients in the relevant reference group. Values 
greater than 0 indicate that the firm falls into a higher percentile of risk within its 
reference group than it does in the full sample and may therefore appear riskier than it 
actually is, while values less than 0 indicate the opposite. Figure 1 provides an example 
and visual depiction of the process and interpretation described above. 8   
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
The first proxy for Audit Outcomes related to Equation (1) (Absolute Value of 
Abnormal Accruals) is expected to take on lower values when auditors treat their clients 
more conservatively. Because Hypothesis 1 predicts that, ceteris paribus, auditors will 
treat clients with high relative risk levels more conservatively, the expected sign for the 
coefficients on the misstatement risk bias proxies is negative. As discussed previously, 
actual misstatement risk is controlled for in the model. It is worth noting that the 
predicted sign for the coefficient on actual misstatement risk is positive – opposite of the 
																																																																		
7 A limitation of this design is that it only captures public firms which appear in both Compustat and Audit 
Analytics. However, given the systematic differences between private and public firms, it seems unlikely 
that auditors use private firms as benchmarks when assessing the risk of their public clients. 
8 This example for calculating Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) generalizes in an 
obvious way to the other seven measures of risk bias, with one caveat. Where the term “Population” in 
Equation (2) indicates all firms receiving audits during the year in the example, the “Population” is limited 
to firms within the same industry-year (single-digit SIC code) when the industry-related reference groups 
(Office-Industry and Firm-Industry) are used.  
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predicted sign for misstatement risk bias (i.e. high risk clients are expected to have higher 
abnormal accruals). This helps allay concerns that the misstatement risk bias measures 
are simply capturing actual risk rather than a contrasting effect.  
The second proxy for audit outcomes is the issuance of a going concern opinion 
(Going Concern). Because the issuance of a going concern opinion is one form of 
conservative behavior by auditors (Krishnan 1994), the expected sign for the coefficients 
on the bankruptcy risk bias proxies is positive.  
A broad set of client and auditor characteristics are controlled for in vector X of 
Equation 1. First, because auditors’ general level of conservatism may vary with the 
overall risk level of their client portfolio, the office-year median value of the risk metrics 
discussed above (Misstatement Risk and Bankruptcy Risk) are included in the models 
(Median Office Misstatement Risk and Median Office Bankruptcy Risk).9 A proxy for 
audit office size (Audit Office Size), equal to the natural log of the sum of all client assets, 
is included to control for the impact of office size on client treatment (Francis et al. 2013; 
Choi et al. 2010; Francis and Yu 2009). An indicator variable (Big4) – which is set equal 
to 1 if an observation’s auditor is a member of the Big4 and set to 0 otherwise – is 
included to help control for the well-documented differences between the clients of Big4 
and non-Big4 auditors, and for the differences in incentives and capabilities of these 
groups of auditors (DeAngelo 1981). Proxies for local and national industry leadership 
(Local Market Industry Leader and National Market Industry Leader) are also included 
																																																																		
9 The goal of controlling for median office risk is to ensure that any relationship between the proxies for 
potential risk bias and audit outcomes relates to the given client’s position position within the risk 
continuum of the office, rather than the position of the office in the risk continuum of the broader market.  
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in the models to account for differences in the audits conducted by industry experts 
(Francis et al. 2005; Krishnan 2003; Ferguson et al. 2003; Taylor 2000).  
 A standard set of client firm-year controls are also included in Equation 1. The 
natural log of client assets (Client Size) is included because large clients are less likely to 
fail and less likely to have high levels of abnormal accruals. Auditors may treat young 
clients, highly leveraged clients, clients with large amounts of newly acquired external 
financing, or clients reporting losses more conservatively, and so client age (Age), 
leverage (Leverage), change in leverage (Annual Change in Leverage), new financing 
(New Finance) and an indicator variable indicating negative income (Loss) are added to 
the model. Similarly, high levels of volatility may trigger conservative treatment by 
auditors, and so the rolling three-year standard deviation of cash flow (Rolling SD of 
Cash Flows) and revenue (Rolling SD of Revenue) are controlled for. Client performance 
is also likely to impact how auditors view and treat their clients, and so cash flows 
(Operating Cash Flows), market performance (Annual Stock Return), and return on assets 
(Return on Assets) are included in the model. Because an audit office’s largest clients 
present a unique set of incentives and risks (Reynolds and Francis 2001), the relative size 
of each client (Client Influence) is added to the models. Finally, for specifications where 
Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals is the dependent variable, a lagged value of 
abnormal accruals [Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (t-1)] and the variable Going 
Concern are included as additional controls. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the influence of outliers. A complete list of variables 
and their definitions is provided in Appendix A. 
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3.2 Audit Fee Model  
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors’ contrasting-induced conservative (lax) 
treatment of some clients will result in a higher (lower) audit fees for those clients. The 
following model is used to test this hypothesis:  Log	of	Audit	Feesit	=	α	+	β	*	Risk	Biasit	+	γ	*	Actual	Client	Riskit	+	λ’Y	+	ε	 (4) 
where the subscripts i and t take the same meanings as in Equation (1). The proxies for 
Risk Bias and Actual Client Risk also remain the same as in Equation 1. The dependent 
variable in Equation 4 is the natural log of total audit fees (Log of Audit Fees). The 
variables included in vector Y of Equation 4 largely overlap with those included in vector 
X of Equation 1, but also include the number of business operating segments (Number of 
Business Operating Segments) and the number of geographic operating segments 
(Number of Geographic Operating Segments) to control for the additional expense and 
complexity involved with auditing firms that operate in diverse business and geographic 
settings. In addition, an indicator variable coded as 1 for firms with financial year ends of 
December 31st and 0 otherwise (December 31st Fiscal Year End) is included to control for 
the typical auditor “busy season” in which audit firms often face capacity constraints 
(Bills et al. 2015). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
to limit the influence of outliers. A complete list of variables and their definitions is 
provided in Appendix A. 
3.3 Auditor Switching Model 
  Hypothesis 3 predicts that auditors’ conservative (lax) treatment of some clients 
will result in a higher (lower) probability that such clients switch auditors. The following 
model is used to test this hypothesis:  
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Switchit+1	=	α	+	β	*	Risk	Biasit	+	γ	*	Actual	Client	Riskit	+	δ’Z	+	ε	 (5) 
where the subscripts i and t take the same meanings as in Equation (1). The proxies for 
Actual Client Risk Level and Risk Bias also remain the same as in Equation (1). The 
dependent variable in Equation (5) takes the form an indicator variable set equal to 1 if 
client i is audited by a different audit firm in year t+1 than it was in year t; 0 otherwise 
(Switch). Because higher values of all proxies for Risk Bias indicate that clients appear 
riskier in their local context than in the context of the entire sample, the coefficients 
related to each proxy are expected to be positive in Equation (5).  
 The set of control variables included in vector Z of Equation (5) partially overlaps 
with the set included in vector X of Equation (1), but is primarily based on the model of 
Landsman et al. (2009). It includes controls for client growth (Asset Growth), earnings 
quality (Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals), performance (Return on Assets and Loss) 
and the contents of clients’ balance sheets (Inventory and Receivables, Cash, and 
Leverage). Because firms often switch auditors following mergers and acquisitions, an 
indicator variable (Acquisition) – set equal to 1 if the client engaged in a merger or 
acquisition in the preceding two years; 0 otherwise – is included as a control. Two types 
of modified auditor reports are controlled for. First, the variable Going Concern is 
included in the model. Second, a separate indicator variable – set equal to 1 if an opinion 
is modified for any reason other than a going concern issue; 0 otherwise (Modified Report 
Other Than GCAR) – is added. The variables Local Market Industry Leader and National 
Market Industry Leader are included, as well as the auditor’s tenure with the client 
(Tenure). Finally, a measure of the potential client-auditor mismatch suggested by Shu 
(2000) is included (Mismatch). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
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percentiles to limit the influence of outliers. A complete list of variables and their 
definitions is provided in Appendix A. 
3.4 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
The sample selection process used in this study begins with all firm-years at the 
intersection of the Compustat Annual and Audit Analytics Opinions databases for the 
years 2000 through 2014 (95,637 firm-years). The year 2000 is chosen as the initial year 
of the sample because Audit Analytics data from before 2000 is very sparse. The year 
2014 is the last year for which data could be obtained at the time of this writing. 
Observations with missing values for required variables are removed, as are firm-years 
audited by the now defunct Arthur Andersen, resulting in an initial sample of 41,274 
firm-years.10 In cases where Going Concern is used as the dependent variable, the 
convention of limiting the sample to distressed firm-years (i.e. those with negative cash 
flows or negative income) and firms that have not previously received a going concern 
opinion is followed (DeFond et al. 2002). This results in a sample of 14,193 firm-years. 
Finally, in supplementary analysis propensity-score matching is used, further reducing 
the sample to 17,153 firm-years (7,049 distressed firm-years). Appendix B details the 
sample selection process.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The 
statistics for the dependent variables and the variables related to risk are of particular 
interest. The values of the dependent variables are generally consistent with the prior 
literature (Francis et al. 2005; Francis and Michas 2013; Carson et al. 2013; Francis et al. 
																																																																		
10 Results are robust to including Arthur Andersen clients in the analysis.  
	 19	
2013; Landsman et al. 2009). The absolute value of abnormal accruals (Absolute Value of 
Abnormal Accruals) is equal to approximately 12 percent of total assets on average. 
Approximately 11 percent of firm-years in the sample receive a going concern opinion, 
while 10 percent eventually restate their financials, one percent enter bankruptcy in the 
subsequent year, and nine percent switch auditors.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The proxies for risk bias measured at the office level show that the mean and 
median firms in the sample have relative risk levels similar to their absolute risk levels; 
that is, the mean and median values of Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to 
Office) and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) are close to 0. However, 
there is significant variability in these variables, as demonstrated by their low 25th 
percentiles (-.247 and -.278), high 75th percentiles (.296 and .245), and large standard 
deviations (.378 and .363). When the entire firm is used as the peer group with the 
variables Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) and Bankruptcy Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Firm) the mean and median values remain close to 0, however, 
there is much less variation in these measures. Both the 25th and 75th percentiles are close 
to 0, and the standard deviations are relatively small.11 Restricting peer groups by 
industry using Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry), 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry), Bankruptcy Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to 
Office-Industry) has the expected effect of moving the mean values of the bias measures 
																																																																		
11 It should be expected that, as the sample size increases from the number of clients in an individual 
practice office to the number of clients in each firm, sample characteristics begin to converge to population 
characteristics.  
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away from 0. Some observations are lost when calculating these measures because they 
belong to office-industry-years or firm-industry-years without at least three 
observations.12   
																																																																		
12 In order to be included in the sample, each observation must belong to a peer group of at least three firm-
years. Results are robust to increasing this restriction to 10 firm-years.  
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4. PRIMARY RESULTS 
4.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
 Table 2 provides the results of estimating Equation 1 using Absolute Value of 
Abnormal Accruals as the dependent variable and misstatement risk bias proxies as the 
variables of interest. The first model (Model 1) excludes bias proxies, but includes the 
measure of actual client misstatement risk (Misstatement Risk). Consistent with the 
notion that high misstatement risk clients are likely to have high levels of discretionary 
accruals, the coefficient on Misstatement Risk is positive and significant. In Model 2, 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) is added to the model and, 
consistent Hypothesis 1, the coefficient is negative and significant. This suggests that 
clients which appear risky by contrast with other clients of the same office are treated 
more conservatively by their auditors, resulting in lower levels of discretionary accruals, 
even after controlling for clients’ actual risk levels. This effect is economically as well as 
statistically significant. The coefficient of -0.109 in Model 2 suggests that, holding actual 
risk levels (and other control variables) constant, a one standard deviation increase in the 
misstatement risk bias proxy (.363) results in a decrease in discretionary accruals of 3.9 
percent of assets (0.363*-0.109), or approximately 30 percent of the sample mean. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Model 3 of Table 2 replaces Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) 
with Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry). The coefficient on 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) is negative and 
statistically significant, consistent with an office-industry effect. However, the magnitude 
of the effect is significantly (p<.05) smaller when measured at the office-industry level 
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(Model 3) than when measured at the office level (Model 2).13 Models 4 and 5 use the test 
variables Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) and Misstatement 
Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm). The coefficients on both variables are statistically 
insignificant, providing no support for the hypothesis that auditors fixate on the risk 
levels of their firm or firm-industry client portfolios. Finally, in Model 6, all four 
misstatement risk bias proxies are included in the analysis. The results from the combined 
analysis are consistent with the individual models; the effect predicted by Hypothesis 1 is 
strongest when measured at the office level using Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured 
Relative to Office), followed by the office-industry level using Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office-Industry). 
 Table 3 parallels Table 2 but uses Going Concern as the dependent variable and 
the bankruptcy risk bias proxies as the variables of interest. Following the prior literature 
on the determinants of going concern opinions, the sample used in Table 3 is limited to 
distressed firms (DeFond et al. 2002).14  The first model (Model 1) excludes proxies for 
risk bias, but includes the measure of actual client bankruptcy risk (Bankruptcy Risk). 
Consistent with the notion that high bankruptcy-risk clients are more likely to receive 
going concern opinions, the coefficient on Bankruptcy Risk is positive and significant. In 
Model 2, Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) is added to the model and, 
consistent with the effect predicted by Hypothesis 1, the coefficient is positive and 
																																																																		
13 The smaller magnitude and lower significance of coefficients on the industry restricted measures may be 
a function of noise introduced by relatively small denominators in the first quotients of Equations (1) and 
(2). For instance, if there are only three observations in an office-industry-year, the first quotient of 
Equations (2) and (3) can take only three possible values (.33, .66, or 1). The granularity of the bias 
measures is increased, and noise is therefore reduced, as the number of observations in a peer group 
increases.  
14 As discussed in Section III above, “distressed” refers to firms which have 1) negative cash flows, 2) 
negative income, or 3) both negative cash flows and negative income.  
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significant. This suggests that clients which appear risky relative to other clients of the 
same office are treated more conservatively by their auditors, resulting in more going 
concern opinions, even after controlling for clients’ actual risk levels. This effect is 
economically as well as statistically significant. Based on the results in Model 2, holding 
actual risk levels (and other control variables) constant, the marginal effect of a move 
from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean 
of Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) (e.g. a change from -.19 to .19) is 
an approximately 2.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving a going 
concern opinion.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 replace Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to 
Office) with Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) and 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry). The coefficient on both 
variables is positive and statistically significant, consistent with an industry-based 
contrasting effect.  However, the magnitude of the effect is significantly smaller (p<.01) 
when measured at the office-industry level (Model 3) or firm-industry level (Model 4) 
than when measured at the office level (Model 2). Model 5 uses the test variable 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) and finds no statistically detectable 
effect on the propensity of a firm to receive a going concern opinion. Finally, in Model 6, 
all four bankruptcy risk bias proxies are included in the analysis. Consistent with the 
individual models, the effect predicted by Hypothesis 1 is strongest when measured at the 
office level using Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office). 
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 The results from Tables 2 and 3 suggest that auditors do succumb to contrast 
effects when assessing client risk and that auditor conservatism varies predictably as a 
result. Although the effect of contrasting on audit outcomes is consequential in its own 
right, it may also produce secondary effects for audit pricing and client turnover. The 
following two subsections are devoted to testing this possibility. Because the strongest 
evidence from Tables 2 and 3 supports the notion that auditors contrast using the risk 
levels of other clients within their home office (rather than on the risk levels of clients 
within the same industry or within the entire audit firm), subsequent tests use only the 
office-level bias proxies.  
4.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 
 Table 4 provides the results from estimating Equation (4) which models audit fees 
as a function of relative client risk. Model 1 uses Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured 
Relative to Office) and Model 2 uses Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office). 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that clients which appear riskier (less risky) in the context of 
nearby peers will pay higher (lower) audit fees, regardless of their actual risk levels. 
Consistent with this prediction, the coefficients on both risk bias proxies are positive and 
significant. Both models are log-level and estimated using OLS. The coefficients may 
therefore be interpreted as the percentage change in fees associated with a one unit 
change in the risk bias proxies. Accordingly, a one-unit increase in Misstatement Risk 
Bias (Measured Relative to Office) (e.g. an increase from -.5 to .5) is associated with a 14 
percent increase in audit fees while a similar change in Bankruptcy Risk Relative to Office 
is associated with a 19 percent increase in audit fees.  
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[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 3 
 Table 5 – Panel A provides the results from estimating Equation (5) which models 
auditor switches as a function of risk bias. Model 1 uses Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office) and Model 2 uses Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Relative to 
Office). Hypothesis 3 predicts that because clients which appear riskier (less risky) when 
contrasted with proximate peers are treated with higher (lower) levels of auditor 
conservatism and charged higher (lower) audit fees, regardless of their actual risk levels, 
such clients will be more (less) likely to switch auditors. Consistent with this prediction, 
the coefficients on both risk bias proxies are positive and significant. These effects are of 
economic, as well as statistical significance. Based on the estimation of Models 1 and 2, a 
one unit change in Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) or Bankruptcy 
Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) results in a roughly 2.5 or 1.8 percentage point 
increase in the probability that the client firm changes auditors.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 The results from Models 1 and 2 of Table 5 – Panel A are intuitive, but are not 
descriptive of an audit market in equilibrium. If risk levels are stable over time, and if 
clients subject to auditor bias are more likely to switch auditors, then all clients should 
eventually find suitable auditors. This would result in relatively homogenous client 
portfolios within audit offices and no observable relationship between relative risk levels 
and auditor switching behavior by clients. However, relative risk levels may not be 
stable. By construction, both office-based relative risk bias proxies can change because of 
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either 1) a change in the risk for an individual client or 2) a change in risk for the 
portfolio of clients held by an audit office. If either of these risk levels change over time, 
so long as they do not move in tandem, relative risk levels will also shift. This may 
encourage clients that find themselves drifting closer to the top of their audit office’s 
client-risk distribution to consider switching auditors. To test this possibility, Models 3 
and 4 of Table 5 – Panel A use cumulative three-year changes in the risk bias proxies (i.e. 
3-Year Change in Misstatement Risk Bias and 3-Year Change in Bankruptcy Risk Bias) 
as test variables. Coefficients on the change versions of the risk bias proxies are both 
positive and significant, suggesting that as firms move towards the top of their audit 
office’s client-risk distribution they become more likely to change auditors.  
Switching auditors will only provide a client with relief from contrasting-related 
conservatism if the client’s relative risk level changes as a result. Thus, if increased 
auditor conservatism due to contrast effects is driving clients to switch auditors then they 
should engage new auditors with higher risk portfolios, thereby reducing their own 
relative risk level. Table 5 – Panel B provides the mean and median changes in clients’ 
risk bias levels following auditor switches. Both means and both medians are 
significantly lower than 0 indicating that, on average, firms switch to new auditors with 
higher risk client portfolios. This has the effect of lowering clients’ relative risk, 
potentially alleviating the overly conservative treatment experienced by clients with their 
original auditors. 
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5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS   
5.1 Modeling Positive and Negative Risk Bias Separately 
 The relative bias metrics used in this study naturally partition clients into those 
that are likely to be perceived as riskier than they actually are (those with positive values 
of the bias proxies) and those that are likely to be perceived as less risky than they 
actually are (those with negative values of the bias proxies). Thus far, no distinction has 
been made between these two groups, yet the effects documented in Section IV may not 
be symmetrical and the overall effect documented in previous analyses may be driven by 
either group. To further investigate this possibility, four new variables are created. 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Positive) is set equal to Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured 
Relative to Office) if Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) is positive; 0 
otherwise. Misstatement Risk Bias (Negative) is set equal to the absolute value of 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) if Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office) is negative; 0 otherwise. Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Positive) 
and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Negative) are similarly defined with regard to Bankruptcy Risk 
Bias (Measured Relative to Office). The primary models from tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 
then re-estimated using the separate positive and negative versions of the risk bias 
variables. The results are presented in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 Across all six models in Table 6, both the positive and negative risk bias variables 
are significant in the expected direction (i.e. positive risk bias is associated with more 
conservative treatment, higher audit fees, and a higher likelihood of auditor switching 
while the reverse is true for negative risk bias). However, the magnitude of the 
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coefficients is not symmetrical across positive and negative risk bias. For instance, Model 
1 in Table 6 suggests that auditors do seem to constrain the use of accruals by positive 
misstatement risk bias clients, however the relaxing of such constraints for negative 
misstatement risk bias clients appears to be a much stronger effect. On the other hand, 
Model 2 reveals that, while negative misstatement risk bias clients receive an audit fee 
discount, positive misstatement risk bias clients are charged a comparatively large fee 
premium. Model 3 shows that the auditor switching associated with Misstatement Risk 
Bias, as documented in Table 5, is driven largely by negative risk bias clients’ reluctance 
to leave their current auditor, although positive risk bias clients are slightly more likely to 
leave their auditors. For each model using Misstatement Risk Bias (Positive) and 
Misstatement Risk Bias (Negative) (i.e. Models 1, 2, and 3) the difference in the absolute 
value of the coefficients on the two variables is significant at p<.05 or better. The 
difference in magnitude of the coefficients on Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Positive) and 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Negative) in Models 5, and 6 is significant in the same direction as 
in Models 2 and 3 for misstatement risk bias. The difference in Model 4 is not 
statistically significant.  
5.2 Risk Bias and Client Firm Outcomes 
The analysis to this point has proceeded under the implicit assumption that 
contrasting effects, as captured by the relative risk variables Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office) and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office), is 
an arbitrary function of each offices’ client portfolio and has no relationship with actual 
client-level outcomes. Table 7 explicitly tests this assumption. If, in fact, the measures of 
“bias” used in the preceding analyses are associated with negative client outcomes such 
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as restatements and bankruptcies, auditors may be justified in treating clients with high 
relative risk levels more conservatively. In other words, if Misstatement Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office) predicts actual misstatements or if Bankruptcy Risk Bias 
(Measured Relative to Office) predicts actual bankruptcies, the relationship between these 
variables and auditors’ conservative treatment of clients may represent a rational 
response and not a behavioral bias.  
The dependent variables in Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 are Misstatement (an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a client-firm eventually restates its issued financial statements; 0 
otherwise) and Bankruptcy (t+1) (an indicator variable equal to 1 if a client files for 
bankruptcy in year t+1; 0 otherwise), respectively.  The test variables are the same as in 
the previous tests – namely, Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) and 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office).15 Although both proxies for actual 
client risk (Misstatement Risk and Bankruptcy Risk) predict negative client outcomes, the 
risk bias variables are statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no observable 
relationship between measured risk bias and and related client outcomes. Thus, the 
relationship between contrast effects and audit outcomes evidenced by the analyses in 
Tables 2 through 4 appears to represent an unsupportable bias on the part of auditors.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
																																																																		
15 As discussed in reference to Table 6, the bias metrics used in this study naturally partition clients into 
those that are likely to be perceived as riskier than they actually are (those with positive values of the bias 
proxies) and those that are likely to be perceived as less risky than they actually are (those with negative 
values of the bias proxies). Including these positive and negative components separately in the models of 
Table 7 does not change the (lack of) results. 
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5.3 Propensity Score Matching 
There are likely to be important differences between clients with high and low 
values of the test variables Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) and 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office). Importantly, these relative risk 
proxies may be capturing some component of actual client risk (although the test in Table 
7 helps to rule out this possibility).16 Ideally, all firms in the sample would have the same 
level of actual risk but different levels of relative risk, so that actual risk could be ruled 
out as an explanation for the observed relationship between relative risk and audit 
outcomes. Although Equation (1) includes controls for numerous client and auditor 
characteristics (including proxies for clients’ actual risk), significant imbalance in these 
characteristics may render their inclusion as controls in typical multivariate regression 
models insufficient to remove bias (Armstrong et al. 2010).  To examine this possibility, 
the samples used in the original analysis are split into two groups based on the values of 
the risk bias proxies. The first group includes observations that fall in the top quartile of 
measured risk bias and the second group includes all other observations.  
The first four columns of Table 8 – Panel A examine the average values of actual 
risk (i.e. Misstatement Risk and Bankruptcy Risk), as well as several other key variables 
(i.e. Median Office Misstatement Risk, Median Office Bankruptcy Risk, Client Size, Office 
Size, and Big N) across the risk bias partitions. Column three provides the differences in 
means. Column four provides standardized differences (i.e. the “bias” percentages), 
																																																																		
16 Alternatively, clients relative risk may capture some auditor characteristic not sufficiently controlled for 
in previous models. The inclusion of auditor variables in the propensity score matching procedure 
documented in this section helps address this concern.  
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which have advantages over simple t-tests when assessing balance in covariates (Austin 
2009).17  
[Insert Table 8 Panel A Here] 
Nearly all of the differences shown in the “Before Match” portion of Table 8 – 
Panel A are highly statistically significant. Moreover, the standardized differences 
indicate worrisome levels of covariate imbalance. There is no consensus on when 
standardized differences indicate the potential for bias, however several researchers have 
offered “rules of thumb”. For instance, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) use a cut-off of 20 
percent to indicate a “substantial difference”, but other researchers have suggested 10 
percent (Austin 2009). Using either standard, many of the variables in Table 8 – Panel A 
are potentially problematic. One common method of addressing covariate imbalance is to 
use a propensity-score matched sample (Austin 2009). Propensity-score matching was 
first suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and attempts to maximize differences in 
a variable of interest [in the case at hand, Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to 
Office) and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)] while minimizing 
differences in potentially confounding covariates.  
To help address the covariate imbalance shown in the “Before Match” portion of 
Table 8 – Panel A, a propensity score match is performed using a caliper of .03.18 The 
matching procedure reduces sample sizes considerably, however, the loss of sample size 
																																																																		
17 The formula for computing the standardized difference is	100(xn − xop)/[(snt + sout )/2]n/t where, xn 
and xop are the sample means of the treated group and the matched control group (or the treated and 
matched reservoir if performed before matching) and sntand sout  are the sample variances in the treated and 
control reservoir. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for more information.   
18 When a treatment observation cannot be matched to a control within a caliper of .03 it is removed from 
the sample and so the matched samples are slightly smaller than half the size of the full samples. 
Unreported robustness test show that results are not sensitive to the use of a nearest neighbor match with no 
caliper, or to the use of a caliper of .05.  
	 32	
is offset by significantly better covariate balance. The “After Match” portion of Table 8 – 
Panel A shows differences for the same variables in the “Before Match” portion, but uses 
the matched sample. The differences in almost all the variables are reduced considerably. 
There are only three variables with means that are (weakly) statistically different (at 
p<.10) and standardized differences are all below 10 in the matched sample.  
Table 8 – Panel B re-estimates the primary tests of Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 using the 
matched sample. The control variables included in the original full-sample tests are also 
included in the models for Table 8 – Panel B but are not shown to conserve space. All of 
the results originally estimated in the full sample also hold in the matched sample. Thus, 
it appears that the results from the original analyses is not driven by covariate imbalance.  
[Insert Table 8 Panel B Here] 
5.4 Cross-sectional Results 
 Next, the primary results of this study are examined cross-sectionally. Six 
different variables which may impact auditors risk assessment bias are used as partitions. 
First, audit office size (the top decile versus bottom nine deciles) and Big-4 status are 
used as a partitioning variables because prior research suggests that the largest audit 
offices and audit firms have the ability and incentives to perform superior audits 
(DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Yu 2009). Next, auditor tenure is used as a partition (tenure 
of two years or less versus tenure greater than two years) because auditors may be 
especially susceptible to cognitive biases when assessing the risk of a client that is still 
relatively unfamiliar. Highly influential clients may prompt more careful consideration of 
risk by auditors, and so bias is examined separately for clients above and below the 
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median level of the variable Client Influence. Prior research suggests that expertise may 
dampen the impact of cognitive biases (Joyce and Biddle 1981) and so the variable Local 
Market Industry Leader is used as a partition. Finally, the substantial increase in audit 
market regulation following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act may have reduced 
auditor biases. The year 2004 (the first year the PCAOB was fully operational) is 
therefore used as a partition.  
 The results of re-estimating the primary models of this study separately in the 
subsamples discussed above are shown in panels A through F of Table 9. Consistent with 
the preceding discussion, the coefficients in the left two columns are consistently larger 
in magnitude than the coefficients in the right two columns and, in most cases, these 
differences are statistically significant. Thus the cross-sectional tests provide some 
corroborating evidence for Hypothesis 1.    
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.5 The Impact of DDAR on Bias at Deloitte 
 As discussed in Section 2, in response to the issuance of Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 2237 by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Deloitte 
implemented a proprietary tool (“DDAR”) designed to help standardize its assessment of 
client risk. If DDAR was successful in standardizing client risk assessment, the 
contrasting effects demonstrated in the preceding tests should be (at least partially) 
mitigated at Deloitte relative to other audit firms in the post-implementation period. A 
difference-in-difference research design is used to test this prediction.  
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 First, two new variables are defined. Deloitte is an indicator variable set equal to 1 
if a firm-year is audited by Deloitte; 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable set equal to 
1 if the year is 2005 or later; 0 otherwise.19 These two variables are interacted with each 
other and with the risk bias proxies Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) 
and Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office). The sample for the difference-
in-difference test is limited to clients of Big 4 auditors so that the three-way interactions 
capture the change in contrasting at Deloitte between the pre and post periods, relative to 
the change for other comparable Big 4 audit firms over the same period. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 10. Consistent with the implementation of DDAR 
standardizing client risk assessment at Deloitte, the difference-in-difference coefficients 
(i.e. the coefficients on the three-way interactions) take signs opposite to their related risk 
bias variables and are statistically significant. Thus it appears that DDAR was successful 
in limiting the effect of contrasting in auditors’ assessment of client risk.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
																																																																		
19 One limitation of this test is that a “clean” post period is difficult to define. Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release number 2237 was issued in the year 2005, but relates to Deloitte’s audits of Adelphia 
for the years 1998 through 2001. The language in the enforcement release implies that Deloitte’s 
implementation of DDAR was in response to the Adelphia case, suggesting that implementation likely 
occurred sometime between the last year covered by the enforcement release (2001) and the date that the 
enforcement release was issued (2005). As sensitivity, each year in this period was used separately to 
define the Post variable. The year 2004 yields results similar to those presented in Table 10. The 
difference-in-difference coefficients (i.e. the coefficients on the three-way interactions) lose their 
significance when years prior to 2004 are used to define the post period.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 This study extends the existing work on contrasting effects by providing robust 
archival evidence on the effect of bias in auditors’ assessments of client risk. When 
assessing client risk, auditors are required to make highly subjective judgments about 
uncertain quantities (such as risk levels), and they plan and conduct their audits according 
to these judgments. However, auditors do not assess client risks in a vacuum – rather, 
they are surrounded by potential reference points. This paper predicts, and finds, that 
auditors contrast the risk of a target client against other firms in their environment. This 
results in conservative audit outcomes for clients that appear risky relative to the other 
clients within the audit office and, conversely, in less conservative audit outcomes for 
clients that appear less risky. This result holds after controlling for the clients’ actual risk 
levels. Moreover, auditors appear to adjust their fees in response to both actual and 
perceived risk.  
The effects of auditor contrast effects on clients’ auditor-switching behavior is 
also examined. Because auditors risk assessment bias is, in part, a function of the risk 
level of the other clients of the audit office, clients may be able to avoid overly 
conservative treatment by switching to an auditor with a riskier client portfolio. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the evidence suggests that clients with high relative risk 
levels are more likely to switch auditors. Clients that have large positive changes in 
relative risk during the previous three years are also more likely to switch auditors. 
Moreover, when clients switch auditors, they often choose new auditors with a higher 
risk client portfolio, effectively lowering their own apparent risk by comparison. 
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These findings represent some of the first archival evidence on the existence and 
consequences of contrast effects in the behavior of financial statement auditors and 
contribute to the extant ligature on how auditors assess client risk. This paper also 
complements the growing experimental literature on auditors’ susceptibility to contrast 
effects by demonstrating that these effects manifest in practice, despite countervailing 
mechanisms (such as prescriptive audit standards and a powerful independent regulator) 
which are difficult to replicate in a laboratory setting. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions   
Dependent Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals The absolute value of the residual form the Jones (1991) model, controlling for firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005).  
Going Concern Opinion An indicator variable equal to 1 for client-years which received a going concern opinion from their auditor; 0 otherwise (Audit 
Analytics item GOING_CONCERN).  
Restatement An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm-year’s financial statements were eventually restated for any reason, as reported by Audit 
Analytics’ Restatements database; 0 otherwise. 
Bankruptcy (t+1) An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 and 11 during the year; 0 otherwise. 
Switch An indicator variable equal to 1 if a client is audited by a different audit firm in year t than it was in year t-1; 0 otherwise.  
Type I Error An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion during the year and does not file for bankruptcy during 
the subsequent year.  
Type II Error An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm does not receive a going concern opinion during the year and does file for bankruptcy 
during the subsequent year.  
  
Variables of Interest  
Restatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) A measure of the difference between a client's restatement risk relative to the portfolio of other clients audited by the same practice 
office and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed during the same period.  
Restatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) A measure of the difference between a client's restatement risk relative to the portfolio of other clients within the same industry and 
audited by the same practice office and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed within the same industry and during 
the same period.  
Restatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) A measure of the difference between a client's restatement risk relative to the portfolio of other clients within the same industry and 
audited by the same firm and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed within the same industry and during the same 
period.  
Restatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) A measure of the difference between a client's restatement risk relative to the portfolio of other clients audited by the same firm and 
its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed during the same period.  
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) A measure of the difference between a client's bankruptcy risk relative to the portfolio of other clients audited by the same practice 
office and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed during the same period.  
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) A measure of the difference between a client's bankruptcy risk relative to the portfolio of other clients within the same industry and 
audited by the same practice office and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed within the same industry and during 
the same period.  
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) A measure of the difference between a client's bankruptcy risk relative to the portfolio of other clients within the same industry and 
audited by the same firm and its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed within the same industry and during the same 
period.  
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) A measure of the difference between a client's bankruptcy risk relative to the portfolio of other clients audited by the same firm and 
its risk relative to the entire sample of audits performed during the same period.  
  
Risk Related Controls  
Restatement Risk A measure of a client's restatement risk based on the F-Score of Dechow et al. (2011).  
Bankruptcy Risk A measure of a client's business failure risk based on the model of Zmijewski (1984).  
Median Office Restatement Risk The value of Restatement Risk for the median client of a given audit practice office.  
Median Office Bankruptcy Risk The value of Bankruptcy Risk for the median client of a given audit practice office.  
  
Client-Level Controls  
Acquisition An indicator variable equal to 1 if the client firm engaged in a merger or acquisition during the previous 2 years; 0 otherwise.  
Age The number of years between when a client firm first appears in the Compustat Annual database and the year of the observation.  
Annual Change in Leverage The value of Leverage in year t less the value of Leverage in year t-1.  
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Annual Stock Return The cumulative stock return for the 12-month period prior to the observation's fiscal year end.  
Asset Growth Total assets in year t less total assets in year t-1, scaled by total assets in year t-1.  
Cash Total cash as of the balance sheet date scaled by total assets on the same date.  
Client Influence The log of total client-firm assets (Compustat item AT) scaled by the sum of logged total assets for all firms audited by the same 
audit office.  
Client Size A client-year's logged total assets (Compustat item AT) in millions of dollars.  
Inventory and Receivables The sum of a client-year's total inventory (Compustat item INV) and receivables (Compustat item REC) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat item AT).  
Investment Total investment assets of the client-firm at year end, measured as the sum of cash and cash equivalents, short-term investments and 
long term investments in equity, scaled by total assets. 
Leverage Total client-firm debt (Compustat item DLTT) scaled by total assets (Compustat item AT). 
Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if net income (Compustat item NI) is negative; 0 otherwise.  
Mismatch An indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is mismatched with the incumbent auditor, calculated using the methodology in Shu 
(2000); 0 otherwise.  
Modified Report (Other Than GCAR) An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion is modified for anything other than a going concern; 0 otherwise.  
New Finance An indicator variable equal to 1 if a client firm issued new debt or equity during the year.  
Operating Cash Flows Total client-firm cash flows from operations (Compustat item OANCF) scaled by total assets.  
Return on Assets Total client-firm net income (Compustat item NI) scaled by assets (Compustat item AT).  
Rolling SD of Cash Flows The standard deviation of operating cash flows (Compustat item OANCF) for the period t-4 through t-1.  
Rolling SD of Revenue The standard deviation of client firm revenue (Compustat item REVT) for the period t-4 through t-1.  
  
Auditor-Level Controls  
Audit Office Size The logged total assets of clients audited by the audit office in the current fiscal year in billions of dollars.  
Auditor Tenure The number of continuous years in which the current firm has issued an opinion on the client's annual financial statements 
Big4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's auditor is a member of the Big4; 0 otherwise.  
Local Market Industry Leader An indicator variable equal to 1 if the sum of the assets held by clients of an audit office in a given MSA and industry is higher than 
the sum of assets held by the clients of any other audit office in the MSA and industry; 0 otherwise 
National Market Industry Leader An indicator variable equal to 1 if the sum of the assets held by clients of an audit firm is higher than the sum of the assets held by 
the clients of any other firm in the country; 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix B: Sample construction         
  Restatement Risk Sample  
 Going Concern 
Sample 
Compustat firm years, 2000 - 2014  114,117  114,117 
Less firm-years lost in merge with Audit Analytics  -18,480  -18,480 
Combined Compustat and Audit Analytics firm-years   95,637  95,637 
Less firm-years missing values for required variables and those audited by AA -54,363  -54,363 
Less firms with positive income and positive cash flows     -27,081 
Initial Sample  41,274  14,193 
Less firms lost in propensity-score matching  -24,121  -7,144 
Matched Sample   17,153   7,049 
Note: Some observations are dropped in specific tests involving binary dependent variables that are perfectly predicted by the set of control variables. This 
causes sample sizes in some tests to vary slightly from those shown here.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics             
Variables Count Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Standard Deviation 
        
Dependent Variables       
 Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals 41,476 0.124 0.035 0.092 0.224 0.101 
 Bankruptcy (t+1) 41,476 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 
 Going Concern Opinion 41,476 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.317 
 Log of Audit Fees 41,476 13.037 11.945 13.069 14.071 1.480 
 Restatement 41,476 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.311 
 Switch 41,476 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.307 
 Type I Error 41,476 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.311 
 Type II Error 41,476 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 
        
Variables of Interest       
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) 41,476 0.025 -0.247 0.028 0.296 0.378 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) 24,215 0.066 -0.188 0.052 0.312 0.375 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) 31,952 0.003 -0.244 -0.019 0.231 0.366 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) 41,476 0.006 -0.027 -0.007 0.006 0.142 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) 41,476 -0.016 -0.278 -0.007 0.245 0.363 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry) 24,215 0.090 -0.017 0.082 0.198 0.182 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry) 31,692 0.004 -0.032 0.000 0.034 0.066 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm) 41,476 0.016 -0.020 0.003 0.014 0.141 
        
Risk Related Controls       
 Bankruptcy Risk 41,476 -0.008 -2.624 -1.380 0.076 5.213 
 Median Office Misstatement Risk 41,476 0.564 0.397 0.508 0.663 0.243 
 Median Office Bankruptcy Risk 41,476 -0.628 -1.745 -1.257 -0.620 2.404 
 Misstatement Risk 41,476 0.964 0.281 0.490 0.991 2.596 
        
Client-Level Controls       
 Acquisition 41,476 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.462 
 Age 41,476 17.739 8.000 13.000 22.000 13.925 
 Annual Change in Leverage 41,476 0.090 -0.042 0.001 0.061 0.979 
 Annual Stock Return 41,476 0.630 -0.301 0.022 0.394 5.892 
 Asset Growth 41,476 0.470 -0.077 0.038 0.171 17.280 
 Cash 41,476 0.224 0.037 0.132 0.337 0.239 
 Client Influence 41,476 0.128 0.023 0.055 0.128 0.205 
 Client Size 41,476 18.953 17.264 19.076 20.740 2.573 
 December 31st Fiscal Year End 41,476 0.669 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.470 
 Inventory and Receivables 41,476 0.149 0.047 0.115 0.203 0.416 
 Investment 41,476 0.224 0.037 0.132 0.337 0.239 
 Leverage 41,476 0.855 0.291 0.490 0.701 2.230 
 Loss 41,476 0.428 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 
 Mismatch 41,476 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.425 
 Modified Report (Other Than GCAR) 41,476 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.463 
 New Finance 41,476 0.540 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.498 
 Number of Business Operating Segments 41,476 2.890 1.000 1.000 3.000 3.395 
 Number of Geographic Operating Segments 41,476 3.404 1.000 1.000 3.000 5.075 
 Operating Cash Flows 41,476 -0.096 -0.036 0.065 0.124 0.730 
 Return on Assets 41,476 -0.364 -0.140 0.019 0.068 1.876 
 Rolling SD of Cash Flows 41,476 0.216 0.031 0.059 0.125 0.706 
 Rolling SD of Revenue 41,476 0.247 0.071 0.141 0.271 0.339 
        
Auditor-Level Controls       
 Audit Office Size 41,476 23.377 21.186 24.291 25.923 3.319 
 Auditor Tenure 41,476 9.695 4.000 7.000 13.000 7.857 
 BigN 41,476 0.636 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
 Local Market Industry Leader 41,476 0.426 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.494 
  National Market Industry Leader 41,476 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.395 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in subsequent analysis. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 2: Absolute value of abnormal accruals as a function of relative restatement risk.                   
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Variables  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
Absolute 
Value of 
Abnormal 
Accruals 
Variables of Interest             
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    -0.109        -0.077 
     (-5.14)***        (-2.83)*** 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry)     -0.039      -0.050 
       (-1.79)*      (-2.40)** 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry)        -0.003    0.045 
         (-0.05)    (0.63) 
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm)          -0.006  0.033 
Risk-Related Controls  
        (-0.19) 
 
(0.59) 
 Misstatement Risk  0.012  0.015  0.012  0.009  0.012  0.013 
   (3.22)***  (3.87)***  (2.24)**  (1.66)*  (3.21)***  (1.86)* 
 Median Office Misstatement Risk  -0.028  -0.059  0.005  -0.003  -0.028  -0.042 
Client-Level Controls  
(-1.60)  (-3.05)***  (0.19)  (-0.21)  (-1.59) 
 
(-1.80)* 
 Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (t-1)  0.017  0.017  0.093  0.112  0.017  0.153 
   (1.61)  (1.59)  (4.54)***  (2.89)***  (1.61)  (4.47)*** 
 Age  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
   (0.49)  (0.35)  (0.14)  (-0.85)  (0.49)  (-0.30) 
 Annual Change in Leverage  -0.180  -0.181  -0.208  -0.223  -0.180  -0.235 
   (-11.08)***  (-11.12)***  (-8.69)***  (-6.10)***  (-11.08)***  (-5.75)*** 
 Annual Stock Return  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003  -0.000 
   (2.45)**  (2.48)**  (1.23)  (1.51)  (2.45)**  (-0.30) 
 Client Influence  -0.100  -0.045  -0.255  -0.095  -0.100  -0.260 
   (-3.83)***  (-1.61)  (-1.79)*  (-3.74)***  (-3.87)***  (-1.93)* 
 Client Size  -0.015  -0.015  -0.010  -0.008  -0.015  -0.008 
   (-5.72)***  (-5.62)***  (-3.71)***  (-3.44)***  (-5.72)***  (-2.99)*** 
 Going Concern Opinion  0.066  0.061  0.065  0.053  0.066  0.055 
   (3.62)***  (3.32)***  (2.46)**  (2.32)**  (3.62)***  (2.02)** 
 Investment  0.065  0.026  0.087  0.043  0.065  0.027 
   (2.65)***  (0.95)  (3.18)***  (1.83)*  (2.65)***  (0.87) 
 Leverage  0.065  0.065  0.069  0.076  0.065  0.095 
   (7.81)***  (7.76)***  (5.32)***  (4.18)***  (7.82)***  (4.48)*** 
 Loss  -0.030  -0.035  -0.029  -0.030  -0.030  -0.033 
   (-4.23)***  (-4.91)***  (-3.56)***  (-3.90)***  (-4.23)***  (-3.88)*** 
 New Finance  0.031  0.058  0.018  0.021  0.031  0.035 
   (4.00)***  (6.09)***  (2.10)**  (2.71)***  (4.00)***  (3.19)*** 
 Operating Cash Flows  -0.090  -0.092  -0.032  -0.042  -0.090  -0.029 
   (-3.50)***  (-3.59)***  (-0.84)  (-0.91)  (-3.50)***  (-0.54) 
 Return on Assets  -0.032  -0.030  -0.048  -0.046  -0.032  -0.022 
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  (-2.68)***  (-2.53)**  (-2.56)**  (-1.80)*  (-2.68)***  (-0.86) 
Rolling SD of Cash Flows  0.119  0.119  0.187  0.186  0.119  0.274 
   (6.03)***  (6.02)***  (4.67)***  (3.41)***  (6.03)***  (4.69)*** 
 Rolling SD of Revenue  0.059  0.060  0.065  0.032  0.059  0.026 
Auditor-Level Controls  
(2.57)**  (2.64)***  (2.08)**  (1.52)  (2.57)** 
 
(1.03) 
 Audit Office Size  -0.009  -0.010  -0.008  -0.007  -0.009  -0.010 
   (-3.68)***  (-4.02)***  (-2.64)***  (-3.44)***  (-3.68)***  (-3.17)*** 
 Auditor Tenure  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
   (-0.24)  (-0.19)  (0.18)  (-1.22)  (-0.25)  (-0.85) 
 BigN  -0.004  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  0.003 
   (-0.28)  (-0.40)  (-0.25)  (-0.25)  (-0.31)  (0.22) 
 Local Market Industry Leader  0.004  0.005  0.002  -0.003  0.004  -0.006 
   (0.53)  (0.71)  (0.28)  (-0.45)  (0.53)  (-0.80) 
 National Market Industry Leader  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.003  0.008  0.009 
      (1.39)   (1.27)   (1.17)   (0.43)   (1.38)   (1.26) 
 Observations  41274  41274  24130  31566  41274  22007 
 R-squared  0.288  0.289  0.314  0.233  0.288  0.250 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm 
This table models the absolute value of abnormal accruals as a function of relative risk using ordinary least squares regressions. Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels shown for all 
variables. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 3: Propensity to receive a going concern opinion as a function of relative bankruptcy risk.                 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Variables  
Going Concern 
Opinion  
Going Concern 
Opinion  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion 
Variables of Interest             
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)   0.979        1.025 
     (8.88)***        (3.28)*** 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office-Industry)     0.546      -0.214 
       (4.46)***      (-0.73) 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm-Industry       0.767    0.553 
         (7.70)***    (1.72)* 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Firm)          0.072  0.588 
Risk-Related Controls  
        (0.58) 
 
(1.54) 
 Bankruptcy Risk  0.096  0.067  0.106  0.110  0.096  0.093 
   (14.36)***  (9.03)***  (7.20)***  (8.31)***  (14.36)***  (5.28)*** 
 Median Office Bankruptcy Risk  0.014  0.054  0.007  0.033  0.013  0.080 
Client-Level Controls  
(1.45)  (5.30)***  (0.24)  (1.26)  (1.42) 
 
(2.09)** 
 Age  -0.002  -0.002  -0.005  0.001  -0.002  -0.004 
   (-1.09)  (-1.09)  (-1.31)  (0.32)  (-1.09)  (-0.95) 
 Annual Change in Leverage  0.050  0.070  -0.064  -0.109  0.049  -0.035 
   (0.83)  (1.20)  (-0.54)  (-1.17)  (0.83)  (-0.26) 
 Annual Stock Return  -0.006  -0.004  0.011  -0.001  -0.006  0.014 
   (-0.88)  (-0.65)  (1.22)  (-0.10)  (-0.88)  (1.53) 
 Client Influence  -0.113  -0.625  -0.178  -0.362  -0.102  0.301 
   (-0.85)  (-4.22)***  (-0.10)  (-1.24)  (-0.76)  (0.15) 
 Client Size  -0.159  -0.162  -0.232  -0.195  -0.159  -0.250 
   (-9.96)***  (-10.16)***  (-7.59)***  (-8.96)***  (-9.97)***  (-7.57)*** 
 Investment  -1.170  -1.153  -1.590  -1.652  -1.170  -1.536 
   (-11.53)***  (-11.28)***  (-8.57)***  (-10.73)***  (-11.53)***  (-7.37)*** 
 Leverage  -0.177  -0.179  -0.155  -0.198  -0.177  -0.193 
   (-4.72)***  (-5.05)***  (-1.75)*  (-2.56)**  (-4.74)***  (-1.82)* 
 Loss  0.256  0.223  0.172  0.160  0.256  0.119 
   (5.53)***  (4.72)***  (1.95)*  (2.62)***  (5.53)***  (1.25) 
 New Finance  0.135  0.105  0.317  0.291  0.135  0.172 
   (3.49)***  (2.66)***  (4.08)***  (5.09)***  (3.48)***  (1.89)* 
 Operating Cash Flows  -0.392  -0.380  -0.759  -0.747  -0.392  -0.722 
   (-5.03)***  (-5.13)***  (-4.02)***  (-5.36)***  (-5.05)***  (-3.62)*** 
 Return on Assets  0.042  0.035  0.161  0.186  0.042  0.154 
   (1.62)  (1.39)  (2.80)***  (3.68)***  (1.62)  (2.50)** 
 Rolling SD of Cash Flows  -0.051  -0.041  -0.400  -0.222  -0.051  -0.353 
   (-1.00)  (-0.84)  (-1.83)*  (-1.73)*  (-1.00)  (-1.57) 
 Rolling SD of Revenue  0.031  0.040  -0.112  -0.156  0.031  -0.226 
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Auditor-Level Controls  
(0.48)  (0.63)  (-0.72)  (-1.42)  (0.47) 
 
(-1.28) 
 Audit Office Size  0.010  0.000  -0.008  0.009  0.010  -0.017 
   (0.77)  (0.03)  (-0.25)  (0.49)  (0.79)  (-0.54) 
 Auditor Tenure  -0.004  -0.003  0.001  -0.003  -0.004  0.000 
   (-0.98)  (-0.79)  (0.24)  (-0.59)  (-0.96)  (0.05) 
 BigN  0.014  -0.017  0.146  -0.009  0.017  0.176 
   (0.20)  (-0.24)  (1.05)  (-0.10)  (0.23)  (1.18) 
 Local Market Industry Leader  0.095  0.086  0.048  0.143  0.096  0.050 
   (2.20)**  (1.95)*  (0.65)  (2.63)***  (2.21)**  (0.63) 
 National Market Industry Leader  0.005  -0.003  -0.073  0.010  0.006  -0.073 
      (0.10)   (-0.06)   (-0.87)   (0.17)   (0.11)   (-0.85) 
 Observations  14193  14193  5915  10701  14193  5618 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.245  0.256  0.301  0.282  0.245  0.317 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm 
This table models the propensity for a client to receive a going concern opinion as a function of relative risk using probit regressions. Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels shown for all 
variables. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 4: Audit fees as a function of relative restatement and bankruptcy risk.     
   Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Log of Audit Fees  Log of Audit Fees 
Variables of Interest     
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  0.136   
   (6.24)***   
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.192 
     (8.02)*** 
Risk-Related Controls     
 Misstatement Risk  0.005   
   (3.64)***   
 Bankruptcy Risk    0.017 
     (9.33)*** 
 Median Office Misstatement Risk  0.005   
   (0.27)   
 Median Office Bankruptcy Risk    -0.009 
Client-Level Controls  
  (-3.51)*** 
 Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (t-1)  -0.001  -0.002 
   (-0.94)  (-1.48) 
 Age  0.002  0.002 
   (3.27)***  (2.78)*** 
 Annual Change in Leverage  -0.001  0.002 
   (-0.20)  (0.49) 
 Annual Stock Return  0.001  0.001 
   (0.95)  (1.71)* 
 Client Influence  0.021  -0.034 
   (0.55)  (-0.89) 
 Client Size  0.493  0.494 
   (109.14)***  (110.24)*** 
 December 31st Fiscal Year End  0.092  0.087 
   (6.59)***  (6.26)*** 
 Going Concern Opinion  0.203  0.109 
   (11.82)***  (6.10)*** 
 Investment  -0.042  -0.043 
   (-1.49)  (-1.59) 
 Leverage  0.028  0.015 
   (8.07)***  (4.25)*** 
 Loss  0.165  0.114 
   (16.63)***  (11.68)*** 
 New Finance  0.014  0.013 
   (1.36)  (1.53) 
 Number of Business Operating Segments  0.004  0.005 
   (2.27)**  (2.56)** 
 Number of Geographic Operating Segments  0.018  0.018 
   (14.11)***  (14.58)*** 
 Operating Cash Flows  -0.131  -0.104 
   (-12.00)***  (-9.17)*** 
 Return on Assets  -0.017  -0.008 
   (-3.59)***  (-1.62) 
 Rolling SD of Cash Flows  -0.029  -0.020 
   (-3.02)***  (-2.07)** 
 Rolling SD of Revenue  0.205  0.182 
Auditor-Level Controls  
(11.52)***  (10.33)*** 
 Audit Office Size  0.061  0.056 
   (15.45)***  (13.81)*** 
 Auditor Tenure  -0.001  -0.000 
   (-0.52)  (-0.11) 
 BigN  0.149  0.147 
   (6.57)***  (6.51)*** 
 Local Market Industry Leader  -0.028  -0.031 
   (-2.38)**  (-2.65)*** 
 National Market Industry Leader  0.004  0.004 
      (0.26)   (0.26) 
 Observations  41274  41274 
 R-squared  0.864  0.866 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
 Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm 
This table models the log of audit fees as a function of relative risk using ordinary least squares regressions. Two-tailed test statistics and significance 
levels shown for all variables. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 5:          
          
Panel A: Propensity to switch auditors as a function of relative restatement and bankruptcy risk.     
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables  Switch  Switch  Switch  Switch 
Variables of Interest         
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  0.260       
   (7.08)***       
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.192     
     (4.54)***     
 Three Year Change in Misstatement Risk Bias      0.155   
       (4.68)***   
 Three Year Change in Bankruptcy Risk Bias        0.096 
Risk-Related Controls  
      (2.85)*** 
 Misstatement Risk  -0.006    -0.001   
   (-1.70)*    (-0.17)   
 Bankruptcy Risk    -0.016    -0.013 
     (-4.86)***    (-3.89)*** 
 Median Office Misstatement Risk  0.103    0.083   
   (2.52)**    (1.77)*   
 Median Office Bankruptcy Risk    0.053    0.051 
Client-Level Controls    (11.36)***    (10.40)*** 
 Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals  0.045  0.046  0.022  0.053 
   (2.13)**  (2.14)**  (0.86)  (2.31)** 
 Acquisition  -0.148  -0.113  -0.157  -0.121 
   (-6.53)***  (-5.04)***  (-6.06)***  (-4.98)*** 
 Asset Growth  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (1.18)  (0.99)  (0.51)  (0.89) 
 Cash  -0.147  -0.232  -0.242  -0.264 
   (-3.00)***  (-5.05)***  (-4.50)***  (-5.46)*** 
 Going Concern Opinion  0.253  0.211  0.245  0.201 
   (8.05)***  (5.89)***  (6.45)***  (5.15)*** 
 Inventory and Receivables  0.008  0.005  -0.013  -0.012 
   (0.40)  (0.25)  (-1.00)  (-0.98) 
 Leverage  0.003  0.003  -0.012  -0.004 
   (0.61)  (0.49)  (-1.74)*  (-0.67) 
 Loss  0.097  0.071  0.122  0.107 
   (4.53)***  (3.20)***  (4.96)***  (4.51)*** 
 Mismatch  -0.102  -0.073  -0.122  -0.067 
   (-4.86)***  (-3.44)***  (-5.07)***  (-2.92)*** 
 Modified Report (Other Than GCAR)  -0.189  -0.182  -0.275  -0.244 
   (-8.20)***  (-7.86)***  (-10.12)***  (-9.54)*** 
 Return on Assets  -0.012  -0.011  -0.035  -0.018 
Auditor-Level Controls  
(-1.66)*  (-1.48)  (-3.63)***  (-2.26)** 
 Auditor Tenure  -0.092  -0.093  -0.084  -0.084 
   (-20.88)***  (-20.93)***  (-18.75)***  (-19.34)*** 
 Local Market Industry Leader  -0.220  -0.206  -0.230  -0.213 
   (-10.76)***  (-10.05)***  (-9.49)***  (-9.43)*** 
 National Market Industry Leader  -0.357  -0.346  -0.401  -0.396 
      (-13.76)***   (-13.40)***   (-12.58)***   (-13.07)*** 
 Observations  41468  41468  32856  36859 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.178  0.181  0.174  0.173 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm 
This table models the propensity for a client to switch auditors as a function of relative risk using probit regressions. Two-tailed test statistics and 
significance levels shown for all variables. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
 
         
Panel B: Change in relative risk after an change in auditors            
Change in Relative Risk After Auditor Switch:  Mean  Median     
Restatement Risk Relative to Office  -0.078***  -0.075***     
Bankruptcy Risk Relative to Office   -0.092***   -0.079***      
This table shows the man and median change in clients' relative risk following a change in auditor. *** 
Indicates a significant difference from zero at p<.01. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.     
		
51	
Table 6: Positive and negative bias modeled separately.                      
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Variables  
Absolute Value of 
Abnormal Accruals  
Log of Audit 
Fees  Switch  
Going Concern 
Opinion  
Log of Audit 
Fees  Switch 
Variables of Interest             
Misstatement Risk Bias (Positive)  -0.044  0.167  0.120       
  (-2.68)***  (5.87)***  (2.12)**       
Misstatement Risk Bias (Negative)  0.098  -0.110  -0.418       
  (5.76)***  (-4.09)***  (-6.94)***       
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Positive)        1.044  0.257  0.141 
        (7.93)***  (8.50)***  (2.47)** 
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Negative)        -0.837  -0.131  -0.261 
        (-4.29)***  (-4.34)***  (-3.91)*** 
Difference [abs(Positive) - abs(Negative)] -0.054***  0.057***  -0.298**  0.207  0.126**  -0.12* 
Observations  41274  41274  41468  14193  41274  41468 
R-squared  0.299  0.864      0.866   
Pseudo R-squared      0.178  0.256    0.181 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm 
This table reperforms the primary tests from tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 using separate variables to capture positive and negative relative risk. Models 3, 4, and 6 use probit regressions, all other models use 
ordinary least squares regressions. Control variables are included but not shown to conserve space. Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels are shown for all variables. Statistical significance 
is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  
		 52	
Table 7: Client outcomes as a function of relative restatement and bankruptcy risk.  
   Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Restatement  Bankruptcy (t+1) 
Variables of Interest     
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.018   
   (-0.41)   
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.494 
Risk-Related Controls    (1.60) 
 Misstatement Risk  0.008   
   (2.28)**   
 Bankruptcy Risk    0.145 
     (4.74)*** 
 Median Office Misstatement Risk  0.073   
   (1.79)*   
 Median Office Bankruptcy Risk    -0.011 
Client-Level Controls  
  (-0.40) 
 Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (t-1)  0.001   
   (0.33)   
 Age  -0.005  -0.008 
   (-5.68)***  (-1.82)* 
 Annual Change in Leverage  -0.021  0.068 
   (-1.57)  (0.57) 
 Annual Stock Return  0.001  -0.183 
   (0.48)  (-3.61)*** 
 Client Influence  0.058  0.295 
   (0.89)  (0.95) 
 Client Size  0.053  0.218 
   (8.30)***  (6.37)*** 
 Going Concern Opinion  -0.073  1.488 
   (-2.01)**  (14.57)*** 
 Investment  -0.151  -0.268 
   (-3.07)***  (-1.03) 
 Leverage  0.003  -0.273 
   (0.39)  (-1.77)* 
 Loss  0.049  0.272 
   (2.41)**  (2.46)** 
 New Finance  0.064  0.116 
   (2.89)***  (1.12) 
 Operating Cash Flows  0.016  -0.203 
   (0.60)  (-1.57) 
 Return on Assets  -0.023  0.614 
   (-2.21)**  (3.88)*** 
 Rolling SD of Cash Flows  0.017  0.056 
   (0.94)  (0.64) 
 Rolling SD of Revenue  0.070  0.061 
Auditor-Level Controls  
(2.34)**  (0.42) 
 Audit Office Size  -0.015  -0.015 
   (-2.45)**  (-0.48) 
 Auditor Tenure  0.003  -0.005 
   (1.85)*  (-0.61) 
 BigN  0.083  0.064 
   (2.40)**  (0.37) 
 Local Market Industry Leader  -0.026  -0.086 
   (-1.32)  (-0.87) 
 National Market Industry Leader  0.048  0.174 
      (2.10)**   (1.55) 
 Observations  41202  13546 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.057  0.401 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
 Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm 
Column one of this table models the propensity for a client to restate the current year financials as a function of relative restatement 
risk using a probit regression. Column two of this table models the propensity for a client to go bankruptcy in the following year as 
a function of relative bankruptcy risk using a probit regression. Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels are shown for all 
variables. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 8: Propensity Score Matching                 
                 
Panel A: Results of matching 
  Before Match  After Match 
  Mean Treated  Mean Control  Difference  Bias  Mean Treated  Mean Control  Difference  Bias 
Restatement Risk Matching                 
Restatement Risk  1.799  0.688  1.111***  36%  1.799  1.728  0.071*  8% 
Median Office Restatement Risk  0.558  0.566  -0.008***  -3%  0.558  0.553  0.005  2% 
Client Size  18.516  19.097  -0.581***  -23%  18.516  18.494  0.022  1% 
Office Size  22.425  23.691  -1.266***  -37%  22.425  22.351  0.074  2% 
Big N  0.589  0.651  -0.062***  -13%  0.589  0.586  0.003  7% 
                 
Bankruptcy Risk Matching                 
Bankruptcy Risk  1.811  -0.728  2.539***  66%  1.811  1.691  0.12*  4% 
Median Office Bankruptcy Risk  -0.853  -0.648  -0.205***  -10%  -0.853  -0.872  0.019  2% 
Client Size  18.200  18.394  -0.194***  -11%  18.200  18.281  -0.081*  -6% 
Office Size  23.230  23.188  0.042  1%  23.230  23.200  0.03  1% 
Big N   0.671   0.549   0.122***   25%   0.671   0.677   -0.006   -4% 
This table provides differences in for key variables between treatment and control samples, both before and after matching. Treatment firms are those in the top quartile of relative risk. Control firms are those in 
the bottom three quartiles of relative risk.  Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels are shown for all differences. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
                 
Panel B: Performance of tests in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 using a matched sample.                      
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6     
Variables  
Absolute Value 
of Abnormal 
Accruals 
 Log of Audit Fees  Switch  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion 
 Log of Audit Fees  Switch     
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office) -0.064  0.087  0.257           
  (-3.39)***  (2.92)***  (4.24)***           
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)       1.137  0.198  0.475     
                (7.09)***   (4.01)***   (3.71)***     
Observations  17153  17153  17221  7003  7049  7023     
R-squared  0.314  0.858      0.812       
Pseudo R-squared      0.169  0.248    0.224     
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm   by firm     
This table provides the results of performing the primary tests from tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 using a matched sample. Models 3, 4, and 6 use probit regressions, all other models use 
ordinary least squares regressions. Control variables are included but not shown to conserve space.  Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels are shown for all variables. 
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
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Table 9: Cross-sectional test                     
           
Panel A  Small Audit Office (Stronger Predicted Effect)  Large Audit Office (Weaker Predicted Effect)  Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.105    -0.056    -0.049** 
  (-8.26)***    (-2.01)**     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.933    0.785  0.148 
        (8.24)***       (1.50)     
           
Panel B  Non-Big 4 Auditor (Stronger Predicted Effect)  Big 4 Auditor (Weaker Predicted Effect)  Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.138    -0.078    -0.06** 
  (-4.16)***    (-9.39)***     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.815    0.264  0.551*** 
        (5.49)***       (2.64)***     
           
Panel C  Low Tenure (Stronger Predicted Effect)  High Tenure (Weaker Predicted Effect)  Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.101    -0.066    -0.035 
  (-3.22)***    (-5.95)***     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    1.132    0.923  0.209 
        (5.81)***       (6.62)***     
           
Panel D  Low Influence Client (Stronger Predicted Effect)  High Influence Client (Weaker Predicted Effect)  Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.092    -0.065    -0.027* 
  (-7.74)***    (-4.51)***     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    1.601    0.675  0.926*** 
        (7.44)***       (4.88)***     
  Non-Industry Leader Auditor (Stronger Predicted 
Effect) 
 Industry Leader Auditor (Weaker Predicted 
Effect) 
  
Panel E    Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.099    -0.062    -0.037* 
  (-4.19)***    (-5.45)***     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    0.957    0.217  0.74*** 
        (7.13)***       (1.85)*     
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Panel F  Pre-SOX (Stronger Predicted Effect)  Post-SOX (Weaker Predicted Effect)  Difference 
Variables  
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern   
Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.100    -0.065    -0.035* 
  (-3.77)***    (-5.48)***     
Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    1.318    0.759  0.559*** 
        (6.94)***       (5.39)***     
                      
This table examines auditor risk assessment bias cross-sectionally. Additional controls are included in the models but not tabulated to conserve space. Two-tailed test statistics and significance levels 
shown for all variables in table. Differences between the magnitude of coefficients across partitions are provided in the last column, and significance levels are indicated. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 10: Test of DDAR's impact on bias at Deloitte 
   Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  
Absolute Value 
of Abnormal 
Accruals  
Going 
Concern 
Opinion 
Variables of Interest     
 Misstatement Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)  -0.076   
   (-5.22)***   
 Misstatement Risk Bias * Deloitte * Post  0.035   
   (2.18)**   
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias (Measured Relative to Office)    1.247 
     (4.15)*** 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias * Deloitte * Post    -0.842 
Other Variables  
  (-2.12)** 
 Misstatement Risk Bias * Post  -0.010   
   (-0.83)   
 Misstatement Risk Bias * Deloitte  -0.005   
   (-0.82)   
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias * Post    -0.309 
     (-0.92) 
 Bankruptcy Risk Bias * Deloitte    -0.039 
     (-0.06) 
 Deloitte  0.006  -0.078 
   (0.98)  (-0.20) 
 Post  0.058  0.810 
   (1.59)  (3.41)*** 
 Deloitte * Post  0.000  -0.029 
      (0.07)   (-0.07) 
 Observations  26258  8257 
 R-squared  0.345   
 Pseudo R-squared    0.304 
 Other Controls  Yes  Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
  Standard Error Clustering   by firm   by firm 
This table uses a difference in difference approach to test whether the implementation of DDAR 
coincided with a reduction in risk assessment bias for Deloitte relative to the other Big 4 audit firms. 
Additional controls are included in the models but not tabulated to conserve space. Two-tailed test 
statistics and significance levels shown for all variables in table. Statistical significance is indicated as 
follows: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
 	
57	
 	 58	
VITA 
 
Nicholas (Nick) Hallman is a doctoral student in the School of Accountancy with 
research interests in archival financial accounting and auditing. He previously worked as 
an auditor with Deloitte, LLP in Charlotte, North Carolina. Nick holds CPA license in 
North Carolina and is a member of the American Accounting Association. Outside of 
work, he enjoys spending time with his family, camping, hiking, reading, competing in 
the sport of fencing, and writing about himself in the third person.  
